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Abstract
The United States military is performing operations in urban environments with
increasing frequency. Current Department of Defense doctrine is poorly suited to train
and equip today’s warriors with the tools and experience necessary to fight and win in
modern sprawling cities. In order to “close the gap,” the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s
Joint Experimentation Directorate led an effort to run a massively distributed simulation
of a synthetic urban environment utilizing human-in-the-loop operators called URBAN
RESOLVE. The synthetic environment simulated the city of Jakarta with over 1,000,000
buildings and structures and over 120,000 civilian entities. A Red force retreated into the
city while a Blue force attempted to determine the enemy’s Order of Battle. The exercise
generated over 3.7 terabytes of data in seven distinct trials. This research evaluated the
time required to identify targets after detection and the accumulation of identifications
over time, and searched for trends between the seven design trials and between target
groups. Two trends emerged from this research. First, there was a notable difference in
the time required to identify a target once it has been detected based on its target group.
Second, two design trials that are expected to demonstrate show counter-intuitive results.
.
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MODELING URBAN WARFARE: JOINT SEMI-AUTOMATED FORCES IN URBAN
RESOLVE

I. Introduction

Background
In the history of warfare, one of the enduring truths has always been, attack cities
as a last resort. In The Art of War Sun Tzu wrote, “The worst policy is to attack cities.
Attack cities only when there is no alternative…” (Tzu, 1971:78-79). Among other
difficulties and complications, Sun Tzu recognized the extreme difficulty of attacking
walled cities. Successfully laying siege to such a city, while possible, required expending
vast amounts of materiel and human resources. There are few walled cities left in the
world today, and the lethality of modern weapons eliminates their utility as an effective
defense against attack. Nevertheless, modern urban combat presents its own host of
difficulties. Wholesale bombing of cities and the ensuing civilian casualties is both
unnecessary and politically unacceptable. What is more is the realization that it is no
longer enough for the United States to defeat its enemies; we must make all efforts to
provide stability and establish a culture of democracy. The result is that the United States
finds itself not only in the unenviable position of engaging in open urban combat
operations, but also performing peace keeping and stability operations against an
insurgency bent on hastening our departure.
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The challenge facing the Department of Defense (DoD) is developing the tactics,
training, and equipment that will prepare our forces to fight in such urban scenarios.
Before the end of the cold war, the DoD’s primary focus was to prepare for a massive
force on force battle against the USSR. Although urban combat was sure to take place as
the battle raged across the European continent, little attention was given to the needs of
effective urban combat. What little attention there was, focused primarily on small
villages and full force combat not peace keeping and stability operations in a sprawling
metropolis with millions of people, and millions of buildings and structures (Fontenot,
2003). However, recent advances in computer technology, experimental architecture
design, networking, and a renewed focus in light of events in the Middle East, has
resulted in the genesis of large scale distributed synthetic environments designed to
provide the command and control warrior the ability to practice operations in a modern
urban landscape.
URBAN RESOLVE is a three-phase exercise sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces
Command’s (JFCOM) Joint Experimentation directorate (J9). The goal of URBAN
RESOLVE is to “… guide the development of critical warfighting capabilities for the
future joint force commander, with a particular focus on those needed for effective urban
operations,” (Urban, 2006). At its essence, URBAN RESOLVE provides a mechanism to
evaluate the utility of near-future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets within the urban environment and to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) to aid the joint forces commander in gaining situational awareness of enemy
activities.
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URBAN RESOLVE utilizes the Joint Semi-Automated Forces synthetic
environment to allow real-time human-in-the-loop (HITL) interaction by both a Blue and
Red force within a synthetic version of the Indonesian capital of Jakarta complete with
over 1,000,000 buildings and over 120,000 non-combatants moving about the city in a
culturally accurate manner (Wielhouwer, 2005:12-13 and Rafuse, 2006). URBAN
RESOLVE participants control a constellation of approximately 250 ISR assets that
generate tracks from approximately 1100 enemy targets attempting to hide within the
city’s civilian population.
A critical aspect of such a large simulation is the massive data collection and data
analysis needs. A single twenty-four hour run of URBAN RESOLVE generated
approximately 100 gigabytes of data and over forty million rows of data. The entire first
phase, which consisted of seven experimental designs, generated over 3.5 terabytes of
storage space. Yet despite all this data there was only a single replication for each
experimental design. The lack of replications presents difficulties when performing
statistical analysis due to the inability to make assumptions about the data such as
normality and independence.
Problem Statement
This thesis analyzes data produced from the exercise URBAN RESOLVE Phase I
by manipulating the data into various formats and using nonparametric statistics in order
to find trends in the data that will provide additional insight into the results of the
exercise. The challenge for this research effort is to analyze a dataset containing over 40
million rows of data totaling 3.7 terabytes in size. In addition, there are only single
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replications for each of the seven experimental design trials. Finally, the experimental
design varied multiple design parameters between trials and made it difficult to determine
the exact cause of changes observed from trial to trial.
Scope
This research effort will focus on the track-data collected during URBAN
RESOLVE Phase I. The data consists of the complete listing of all tracks generated
when a Blue force sensor detects a target within the simulation. The data includes target
type, detecting sensor, and detection time. If identification was made, the data also
includes the identifying sensor and time of identification. Analysis will focus specifically
on the time required to identify a target (TTI), after a detection has occurred, and how
that time varies between design trials, target groups (soldiers, civilians, mechanized, etc),
and the detecting platform. This research will also investigate the rate at which
identifications are generated for each trial and target group. The intent is to search for
trends in the data that have not been previously identified, and which may indicate areas
for further study.
Outline
The literature review chapter provides an overview of modeling and simulation in
the Department of Defense (DoD), a look at combat modeling past and present, the
growing importance of urban combat, virtual simulation, synthetic environments, and
finally URBAN RESOLVE. The methodology chapter will discuss the URBAN
RESOLVE experimental architecture, experiment design, data collection and reduction,
and finally data analysis. Chapter IV will present the results of our data analysis and
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Chapter V will provide a synopsis of the analysis, obstacles encountered, the significance
of the research and finally recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the various aspects of
combat modeling in a real-time high-resolution synthetic environment. Particular
attention will be paid to combat modeling’s ability to aid in understanding the complex
urban battlefield. This chapter begins with a general discussion of modeling and
simulation and their applications within the DoD. This is followed by an overview of
attrition based combat modeling and its limits. Next will be a discussion of the increased
role of urban combat and asymmetrical conflicts faced by the U.S. military. Following
this is a discussion of synthetic environments and the challenges faced in creating
applicable synthetic urban environments and modeling asymmetrical threat behavior.
Finally, this chapter will discuss the Joint Forces Command sponsored exercise URBAN
RESOLVE.
Modeling and Simulation
According to the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), modeling
and simulation in the DoD is broken into three functional areas: training, analysis, and
acquisition. Models can be further categorized based on their resolution and level of
aggregation. DoD5000.59-M, Department of Defense Modeling and Simulation (M & S)
Glossary (1998), defines resolution and aggregation as, “The degree of detail and
precision used in the representation of real world aspects in a model or simulation,” and
“The ability to group entities while preserving the effects of entity behavior and
interaction while grouped,” respectively. The DoD Services each have extensive libraries
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of models and simulations they use to satisfy these various functional areas. These
models span the spectrum from modeling airfoil fluid dynamics, to operational planning
of a major theater war. Functionally, they range from training operators in weapon
system simulators, analyzing the effects of integrating a new weapon system into the
inventory, and supporting the effectiveness and suitability determination of an acquisition
program. The DMSO Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository (MSRR) contains
hundreds of government accepted models and simulations that may be used for analysis
within the DoD. The hierarchy and functional areas of models and simulations used by
the DoD are represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Hierarchy and Functional Areas of DoD Combat Models (DoD
5000.59-P, 1995)
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Combat Modeling
Combat modeling has historically focused on modeling the attrition of forces in
open combat. Effectively modeling a complex event such as combat typically requires
some minimal level of aggregation. Even with the aid of computers, aggregation is often
required for a timely answer due to limits of processing speed and storage requirements.
The work of Frederick W. Lanchester has dominated combat modeling attrition analysis
since World War I. In 1914, Lanchester described warfare using two basic models. The
first, based on “ancient” warfare, assumes a battle to be a collection of one-on-one duels
and results in a casualty exchange ratio proportional to force size. The second model,
based on “modern” warfare, attempts to capture the effects of weapon lethality and the
ability to concentrate fire, which can result in a many-on-one scenario. Here the casualty
exchange ratio is inversely proportional to the size of the enemy force. These two models
are termed the Linear and Square laws respectively (Hartman, 1997:6-2)
The Lanchester attrition models aggregate warfare. In doing so, they treat all
combatants identically, and ignore differences in individual combatants such as skill,
state of alertness, equipment state of repair, lethality, logistics, complex terrain,
intelligence etc. Over the years, manipulations of the basic equations have allowed for
heterogeneous applications of the Lanchester models that attempt to mitigate some of the
above limitations. However, none of the various additions or complications are able to
capture the impact of maneuver warfare, information, command and control (C2), civilian
casualty avoidance, and asymmetric warfare. When modeling at the theater level of war
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in a force-on-force scenario, these facts may be of little consequence. However, modern
warfare is increasingly dependant on C2, intelligence, and maneuver.
Urban Combat
The battlefield of modern warfare is changing as well. In the post-cold war era,
the United States has demonstrated its ability to prosecute a conventional force-on-force
battle with relative ease. Unfortunately, our adversaries have noticed this too and avoid
open combat whenever possible. In addition, US deployments abroad have grown in
number as the world has become more urbanized and the US finds itself performing
combat operations in the urban environment with increasing regularity (Wielhouwer,
2005:2-5). In the US Army’s analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom, On Point (2003), the
authors discuss the fact that the 1991 Gulf War showed the Iraqi military the futility of
facing coalition forces in open desert combat. Their reaction to this stark reality became
apparent in 2003 as they massed their forces in urban areas such as Baghdad. Although
victory was swift, the on going insurgency shows that the urban environment is where the
US is likely to face its greatest future challenge. Finally, US military operations will
continue to include military operations other than war (MOOTW) in the urban
environment with ever-increasing frequency (Wielhouwer, 2005:2).
An important acknowledgment made in On Point (2003), is the DoD’s
critical weakness at developing effective joint doctrine, tactics, and training for the
modern urban environment. Until recently, urban combat training facilities were limited
to simulating small towns and villages, rather than the vast urban metropolises common
today. Furthermore, DoD modeling and simulation capabilities have lacked the detail,
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scale, and real-time capacity required to realistically train in a virtual simulated urban
environment.
Virtual and Constructive Simulation
The DoD must therefore construct robust simulated environments that will allow
military planners to effectively develop and test doctrine for joint urban operations
(JUO). Virtual and constructive simulations are defined, respectively, by DMSO as “…
real people operating simulated systems,” and “… simulated people operating simulated
systems.” A third type of simulation, live simulation, involves “real people operating real
systems.” (DoD 5000.59-P, A-6:1998) Unfortunately, operating military hardware
within a real urban environment is problematic at best. Nor are we likely to build a fullscale model of a modern urban area complete with non-combatants going about their
daily, simulated, lives. We are therefore limited to training within a virtual and
constructive world where key players can develop and practice tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) in a realistic simulated urban environment.
A synthetic urban environment must include, at a minimum: a robust building set
and terrain map, non-combatants acting in a culturally accurate manner, intelligent
adversaries, vehicle traffic, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets (Dehncke, 2005). These features, and more, must be implemented so that they
operate in real-time and allow for human-in-the-loop (HITL) interaction.
Creating a complex urban environment is not a simple task. Only a few terrain
maps exist with high levels of detail and even fewer building data sets exist that
realistically reproduce the millions of structures that may be present in a modern urban
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area. Nor does merely representing buildings as solid objects suffice. A key feature of
the urban environment is the complexity created by the presence of structures that
provide concealment and firing positions. Structurally they must possess, multiple levels,
allow for realistic structural damaged, fortification, etc. Thus, it is desirable to represent
a building as a fully interactive three-dimensional structure with openings that allow
entry and exit of entities and projectiles, occupation of and travel between multiple
levels, and realistic damage based on weapons effects (Miller, 2003).
In addition to the buildings and terrain, a JUO training environment must include
realistic simulation of non-combatant entities. The requirement to minimize civilian
casualties and the need to identify combatants concealing themselves within the
population demands an accurate depiction of non-combatants. These entities must
behave in a culturally consistent manner performing daily activities on a realistic
timetable (Dehncke, 2005). However, modeling crowds of people goes beyond
accurately simulating a single individual’s behavior under a given situation. Accurately
modeling a crowd requires allowances for different entities to have different motivations
and behaviors when faced with the same situation. A model that includes identically
behaving entities will not appear realistic even if a single entity behaved in a realistic
manner (Ulicny, 2001).
Further complicating the problem for military simulation is the need to model
enemy forces in the urban environment. No longer is it a simple matter to simulate the
behavior of an enemy combatant engaging in open combat using conventional warfare
tactics. Although urban operations can take the form of open combat with a clear enemy,
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the more difficult task of defending against an insurgency or performing peacekeeping
operations is becoming more prevalent as was demonstrated during operations in Kosovo,
Mogadishu, and now Iraqi. The challenge in such environments is to model the
insurgents as they attempt to blend in while performing clandestine nefarious activities.
Synthetic Environment and Semi-Automated Forces
In the past, senior leaders were content to practice the art of war by participating
in what could best be described as glorified games of Risk, controlling the movements of
divisions, corps, and even entire armies as the battle progresses. The need for senior
leaders to train in large-scale, yet highly detailed, battle spaces has become a critical
issue. Senior leaders and strategists must have the ability to train for the more complex
and intricate environments facing them today and in the future. The explosion of ISR
assets and the transformation to network centric warfare has provided unique
opportunities but also unique challenges. The ability to obtain vast quantities of data is
an incredible achievement, however, data is not information, and information is not
understanding.
The ability to generate large-scale high-resolution synthetic environments is
relatively new. Although combat modeling state-of-the-art has been marching at a steady
pace towards such a goal, it is only recently that all the pieces required have fallen into
place. Much of the credit can be assigned to the huge advances in computing power that
have occurred in recent years. However, just as important as the advances in technology
have been, so has the evolution of the need for such environments.
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URBAN RESOLVE
In response to the DoD’s need for realistic urban training and improved tactics
and systems, the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) Joint Experimentation
directorate (J9) sponsored the experiment URBAN RESOLVE in 2004. URBAN
RESOLVE is a three-phase effort, extending to 2007 and beyond, with the goal to, “…
guide the development of critical warfighting capabilities for the future joint force
commander, with a particular focus on those needed for effective urban operations,”
(Urban, 2006). The URBAN RESOLVE experiment takes place within a massive
synthetic urban environment that consists of 1.8+ million building structures. Of those
structures, 65,000 of them allow for increased interaction such that entities can enter the
buildings, fight inside, and see the street from within the building. A key aspect of the
synthetic environment in URBAN RESOLVE is the simulation of a dense urban
population, called cultural features, that included over 124,000 entities with
approximately 35,000 of them active and behaving in a culturally accurate manner.
Testing has shown that over 1 million entities are possible. Green Force participants
controlled the cultural-features (Wielhouwer, 2005:12-13 and Rafuse, 2006).
The first phase of URBAN RESOLVE, URBAN RESOLVE 2015, occurred
between June and October 2004. URBAN RESOLVE 2015’s goal was to assess the
ability of the Joint Forces Commander to attain situational awareness utilizing a myriad
of current and future ISR assets. The Blue Forces’ mission was to employ ISR assets to
detect and predict the movements and presence of Red Force entities as they moved about
within the dense cultural features of the synthetic environment, and to stealthily deploy
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and conceal their ISR assets. Meanwhile the Red Forces’ mission was to challenge,
adapt, and react to the Blue Force in a manner consistent with an aggressive and adaptive
enemy (Wielhouwer, 2005:10-11). The results from Phase 1 were impressive. The Blue
Force detected 80% of the Red Forces, identified 50%-60% of the Red Forces’ current
activities, and anticipated 60%-70% of their future actions (Wielhouwer, 2005:14).
The backbone technologies that made URBAN RESOLVE possible were the
JSAF synthetic environment, the use of distributed Scalable Parallel Processors (SPP)
clusters, the Defense Research Engineering Network (DREN), and the Command and
Control (C2) workstations used for HITL warfighter involvement (Dehncke, 2005). The
JSAF environment was responsible for providing the synthetic environment in which the
exercise occurred as well as the entity level Blue and Red Forces, and the Green team’s
cultural features. Modeling of the sensor data was performed by the Simulation of
Location and Attack of Mobile Enemy Missiles (SLAMEM) federate. Modeling of
HUMINT data was provided by the SOAR-SOF federate. The SPP clusters provided the
raw processing power required for JSAF to generate the environment and entities. The
SPP clusters are located at the Maui High Performance Computer Center (MHPCC) in
Maui, HI and the Aeronautical Systems Center Major Shared Resource Center (ASCMSRC) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Additional computing resources for
Blue, Red, and Green Force operations, simulation control, and the analysis team were
located at Ft Belvoir, VA, San Diego CA, and Suffolk, VA. Linking all these distant
resources together in real-time was the DREN as depicted in Figure 2 (Dehncke, 2005).
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Figure 2. Connectivity between distributed participants (Dehncke, 2005)

The C2 systems for warfighter interaction consist of a JSAF display responsible
for providing the shared tactical picture as perceived by the participants, a JSAF control
terminal for sensor controls, data display assessment, track management, and a terminal
for collaborative tools such a text, chat, voice and graphics (Figure 3).

15

Figure 3. Operator’s C2 Workstation (Dehncke, 2005)

The process of generating a track in URBAN RESOLVE involves the generation
and transmission of “ground truth” data for all entities (Blue, Red, and Green Forces). As
these entities move around the synthetic environment, they may enter the sensor footprint
of an ISR entity. At this point, the simulation decides if the entity is visible to the sensor
based on various criteria such as line-of-site (LOS). If the entity is detectable by the
sensor, this triggers an “interaction” event. The interaction event is then sent to a
confusion matrix, in the SLAMEM federation, that adds a level of uncertainty to the
interaction. The confusion matrix uses data related to the sensors capabilities against the
given target entity, environmental conditions, etc. and generates a track indicating the
possible identity of the track and a confidence value. The tracks are then displayed for
the warfighters on their consoles. As multiple sensor hits accumulate for a given track, a
process within SLAMEM automatically correlates tracks to increase the confidence level
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of the track’s label. An example would be three tracks generated by three different
sensors on a given moving target. When considered separately, each of those tracks may
have a low confidence that the target in question is a tank. However when considered
together, those three tracks may indicate, with a high level of confidence, that the track in
question is a T-72 tank (Rafuse, 2006).
As the warfighters observe the multitude of tracks on their consoles, they can
make inferences as to the intent of the track(s). These inferences are called situational
awareness objects (SAO) that can be considered notional “buckets” that contain a track,
or tracks. An SAO indicates the operator’s guess as to the track’s intent and provides a
mechanism for the operator to share this information with other players. For example, a
series of tracks labeled as vehicles, containing armed civilians, known insurgent leaders,
and traveling together along the same route, may be labeled as an enemy convoy and
placed in an SAO. Analysis of these SAOs is what allowed the exercise evaluators to
determine if the Blue Force was able to accurately determine and predict the activities of
the Red Force (Rafuse, 2006).
What should become apparent from the discussion thus far are the vast quantities
of data such an exercise generates. The dataset for a single twenty-four hour simulation
trial, excluding all cultural-feature data, was approximately ninety to one hundred twenty
gigabytes containing forty to fifty million rows of data. The entire URBAN RESOLVE
2015 Phase 1 exercise consisted of seven such trials. The complete dataset, including all
cultural-features, consumed over 3.5 terabytes of disk space. This presents a significant
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obstacle for data analysis and presents opportunities for new techniques in analysis and
data mining.
Collecting such a vast amount of data presented certain obstacles as well. Early
data collection schemas attempted to push all logged data to a central repository.
However, as the exercise environment grew, the data transfer requirement overloaded the
physical network and resulted in data loss. In addition, it was not possible to log some
simulation event data because of the way cluster computers operate. To address these
limitations URBAN RESOLVE Phase I utilized interceptor/logger applications operating
at each computing cluster. An aggregator application was used to request data of interest
from the individual computing clusters (Graebener, 2004:2-3). The result was a data
collection schema that allowed robust collection without saturating the network and
afforded the analysts near-real-time access to, and analysis of, the data. The backbone of
the database was the open source database engine MySQL. The open source nature of
MySQL allowed the analysts to modify the actual application to suit their needs.
The initial intent of URBAN RESOLVE was as a tool to evaluate the ability of
current and future ISR assets to aid the warfighter in gaining situational awareness in a
modern urban setting. The success of Phase 1 showed senior leaders the potential of
applying URBAN RESOLVE’s experimental approach to problems faced in present day
urban operations. The result was an expansion of URBAN RESOLVE to establish a
baseline of current urban warfare capabilities, and address current challenges faced by
our forces. The two new directives included adapting the modeling and simulation
framework to support its use as a mission planning and rehearsal tool for deploying
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forces, and supporting development of more effective responses to non-traditional mortar
attacks in Iraq (Wielhouwer, 2005:11-12).
Summary
This literature review investigated the current scope of modeling and simulation
in the DOD and the history of combat modeling. The review then continued with a
discussion of urban combat and the DoD’s need to better train and equip our forces to
operate in the urban environment. This led to an examination of computer generated
synthetic environments, semi-automated forces, and ultimately the URBAN RESOLVE
exercise. Finally, this literature review showed that data collection, reduction and
analysis is a significant challenge to such a large-scale event.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodology
employed for the URBAN RESOLVE exercise and the methods used in this research
effort to analyze the data generated from the exercise. It begins with a discussion of
URBAN RESOLVE’s experimental architecture, experimental design, data collection
methods, and data analysis. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of
the available data, a nonparametric method for generating confidence intervals for the
median of single-population data, and finally a description of the analysis performed.
Experiment Architecture
As previously discussed, URBAN RESOLVE Phase I was an exercise
intended to investigate the utility of new and emerging ISR technologies, and the TTPs
used to employ them, in a large-scale HITL synthetic urban environment. The URBAN
RESOLVE exercise took place in the simulated Indonesian capital city of Jakarta. The
Red Forces withdrew into the city to mount a final defense and possess medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBM). The Blue Force Joint Intelligence and Fusion Cell (Blue
Cell) controlled an array of sensor platforms that included unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV), organic aerial vehicles (OAV), and unmanned ground sensors (UGS). The Blue
Cell controlled these platforms to gain situational awareness of the enemy’s activities.
The UAVs operated at medium/high altitude, provided a “persistent” stare into the area of
interest (AOI), and were responsible for initiating and maintaining tracks of Red entities.
The OAVs operated a low altitude were ale to flow down into the AOI and provided a
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closer look to locate, track, and identify Red entities. The OAVs were also capable of
placing radio frequency tags onto vehicles and personnel. The UGSs assisted the Blue
cell in locating, tracking, and identifying Red entities, and in some cases tagging entities
(Burke, 2005:9). A broad range of sensors were available, and included acoustic/seismic,
magnetometer, Ku-band moving target indicator (MTI), Ku-band synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), foliage penetrating SAR, LADAR, Laser Profilers, Electro-optical/Infra-red
(EO/IR), and X-ray sensors. In addition, special operations forces (SOF) and HUMINT
were available (Burke, 2005:24-30). Tracks within URBAN RESOLVE were generated
using the following process:
•

A sensor foot print was projected onto the AOI

•

If an entity fell within that foot print it was tested for LOS, velocity, and
concealment

•

If the entity was deemed “visible” to the sensor the following occurred:
o A random draw was made and compared against the probability of
detection for the sensor-target pairing to determine if the sensor
actually detects a target
o If a detection occurred the entity was processed through a
confusion matrix to determine how the target is classified
o The track was then either passed to the Blue Cell, updated if the
track already existed, or used to cue another sensor-platform pair

Target correlation was modeled perfectly such that two or more sensors that
detected the same target resulted in a single track. Similarly, two targets were never
classified as the same target if they were in close proximity (Burke, 2005:31-32).
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Experiment Design
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I exercise encompassed seven different scenarios.
The exercise variables were Blue Force platforms inventory, target signature, Red Force
activity level, and availability of Tags. The complete exercise design is shown in Table
1. The parameter “reduced Blue platform inventory” meant the removal of all UAVs
with hyperspectral and EO/IR sensors from the simulation. The remaining platforms
were the UAVs with SAR sensors. The intent of the reduction was to simulate a low
cloud ceiling. The parameter for “Red Force signature reduction” simulated attempts by
the Red Force to reduce or alter their signature return. The reduced signature effect was
modeled in the simulation by modifying the detection and identification capabilities of
Blue Force sensors relative to those targets. Red Force activity level (active/inactive)
indicates the proportion of the force that began the event outside the AOI. An active Red
Force started the event with 70% of its forces outside the AOI while an inactive force
started with 70% of forces already inside the AOI. The presence of Tags in the exercise
was varied by allowing or disallowing their use (Burke, 2005:ES7-ES9). Tags are small
radio frequency ID (RFID) tags that are attached to enemy personnel and equipment by
either OAVs or UGSs. Blue Force sensors can track the Tags and provide an effective
method for maintaining situational awareness of a track’s position and identity even if the
track is lost for extended periods within the urban clutter.
An inspection of Table 1 reveals a flaw in the experimental design. In each trial,
more than a single parameter is changed. Designing trials with a multiple parameter
changes makes it difficult to correlate observed changes in the data to changes in a
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particular parameter. A compounding factor to the poor experimental design is the lack
of multiple replicate runs for each trial. This is expected from an exercise of this type
due to the large amount of time and resources required to perform a single replication.
With only single replications, that are not independent, classical statistical comparative
analysis is not possible.

Table 1. Exercise Design (Burke, 2005:16-17)
Trial 1
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Full blue platform inventory
Full target signature
Active Red
48-hour trial
Tags
Trial 2A
Full Blue platform inventory
Full targets signature
Inactive Red
Tags
24-hour trial
Trial 3A
Full Blue platform inventory
Reduced target signature
Active Red
Tags
24-hour trial
Trial 4A
Full Blue platform inventory
Full target signature
Active Red
No Tags
24-hour trial

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Trial 2B
Reduced Blue platform inventory
Full target signature
Inactive Red
Tags
18-hour trial
Trial 3B
Reduced Blue platform inventory
Full target signature
Active Red
Tags
24-hour trial
Trial 4B
Reduced Blue platform inventory
Reduced target signature
Active Red
No Tags
24-hour trial

Data Collection and Reduction
Data collection in URBAN RESOLVE was a monumental task. In any
given event, the constellation of Blue Force platforms numbered between 115 and 330,
many of which had multiple sensors. The constellation was reporting detections on over
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1100 Red Force entities dispersed within a population of over 100,000 cultural features
(Burke, 2005:77-80). Each event run generated approximately 40-50 million rows of
data and consumed 90-120 gigabytes of physical storage space (Rafuse, 2006). Table 2
shows an example of one of the many tables available. This particular table shows the
data generated from a single contact report when a sensor detects an entity.
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Table 2. Raw MySQL data table from URBAN RESOLVE Phase I (2005)
Field
uniqueIndex
node
spaceName
timestamp
platform_id_ID
sensor_id
sensor_plan_mode
batch_flag
FOPEN_depth
owning_force
platform_type_EntityKind
platform_type_Domain
platform_type_CountryCode
platform_type_Category
platform_type_Subcategory
platform_type_Specific
platform_type_Extra
sensor_location_X
sensor_location_Y
sensor_location_Z
platform_velocity_Xvelocity
platform_velocity_Yvelocity
platform_velocity_Zvelocity
sensor_mode
comment
entity_id_ID
location_X
location_Y
location_Z
velocity_XVelocity
velocity_YVelocity
velocity_ZVelocity
appearance
building_attributes
detection_status
detected_type_EntityKind
detected_type_Domain
detected_type_CountryCode
detected_type_Category
detected_type_Subcategory
detected_type_Specific
detected_type_Extra

DataType
STRING
STRING
INTEGER
FLOAT
STRING
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
FLOAT
STRING
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
DOUBLE
DOUBLE
DOUBLE
FLOAT
FLOAT
FLOAT
STRING
STRING
INTEGER
DOUBLE
DOUBLE
DOUBLE
FLOAT
FLOAT
FLOAT
INTEGER
INTEGER
STRING
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER
INTEGER

Description
Unique ID for record within individual logger database
Node hostname
RTI Namespace Name
Local machine timestamp for record (when written)
Identifies the platform this sensor is mounted on.
Sensor ID on this platform
Internal ID of sensor/mode/exploitation combination
Internal use (beg/middle/end of collections)
Two-way detection threshold (meters)
Force of entity object (Friendly/Opposing/Neutral)
Enumeration value for entity object - Kind
Enumeration value for entity object - Domain
Enumeration value for entity object - Country
Enumeration value for entity object - Category
Enumeration value for entity object - SubCategory
Enumeration value for entity object - Specific
Enumeration value for entity object - Extra
GCS Location of entity object - X Value
GCS Location of entity object - Y Value
GCS Location of munition object - Z Value
Movement velocity of entity object - X Value
Movement velocity of entity object - Y Value
Movement velocity of entity object - Z Value
Mode of operation for sensor (MTI, STRIP_EO, etc.)
The comment to attach.
Ground truth id of the entity that got painted.
Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - X Value
Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - Y Value
Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - Z Value
Movement velocity of entity object - X Value
Movement velocity of entity object - Y Value
Movement velocity of entity object - Z Value
Appearance bits of the painted vehicle.
Attribute bits of the painted building.
Enum'd result of the filters, indicating if the vehicle id detectable or not.
Enumeration value for the true guise - Kind
Enumeration value for the true guise - Domain
Enumeration value for the true guise - Country
Enumeration value for the true guise - Category
Enumeration value for the true guise - SubCategory
Enumeration value for the true guise - Specific
Enumeration value for the true guise - Extra
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Obtaining the URBAN RESOLVE data presented some significant challenges for
this research effort. Due to the size of the dataset, we were not able to request the entire
dataset on a portable media format such as a DVD or CD. Initially we tried to work with
a very small subset of the data received on DVD. However, due to database software
differences, a significant amount of time was expended to make the data usable with only
partial success. Even then, we quickly realized that the subset of data was not sufficient
to perform any meaningful analysis. The dataset contained only a four-hour block of
time from a single trial. Eventually we were able to gain direct access to the entire
dataset via the J9 servers housing the data.
Post analysis data reduction of such large quantities of data presented similar
challenges. As with data collection, early data analysis techniques proved problematic as
the datasets grew in size. However, the URBAN RESOLVE analysts were able to use
another open source tool called PHP (recursive acronym for PHP: Hypertext Protocol) to
extract the specific data required to answer the exercise’s measures of performance
(MOP) (PHP, 2006). Table 3 shows a small portion of the data that was aggregated from
the raw dataset. The entire table contains 28,815 rows. Of particular interest to this
research are the “initial detection time”, “initial identification time”, “target type”, and
“track originating platform.” The exercise planners wished to answer three top-level
questions:
1) To what extent can situational awareness be developed during JUO?
2) How effectively are sensor data used to detect and correlate targets?
3) What conditions affect Blue capabilities?

26

Table 3. Track Data table URBAN RESOLVE Phase I Trial 1 (2005)
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This research most directly relates to question three. Each question had a set of
MOPs associated with it that are meant to help answer these top-level questions.
Similarly, each MOP had approximately twelve measures that were used to evaluate the
MOP. Table 4 provides an example of the types of MOPs and measures used in URBAN
RESOLVE. Appendix A contains the entire set of MOPs and measures.

Table 4. Example of URBAN RESOLVE MOP and Associated Measures
Q1. To what extent can SA/SU be developed in JUO
M1.2 Number of Critical Weapon Nodes Identified
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths (see M1.1)
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (see M1.1)
c Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (characteristics)
d Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (location)
e Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (characteristics)
f Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (location)

Data Analysis
The analysis performed in this research will focus on two areas: the time to
identify (TTI) a target once it has been detected and the rate at which identifications are
generated versus time. Each area will be evaluated for patterns or trends between trials,
target groups, and detecting sensor type. As mentioned previously the level of effort and
resources required to perform a given URBAN RESOLVE event meant that only a single
replication was performed for each exercise design trial. Analysis of single replication
data presents several difficulties for an analyst. The assumption that the trials are
independent or identical cannot be made because exercise participants remained the same
for all trials. Ordinarily this may not present a problem, however a definite learning
curve was observed in relation to the proficiency of the players. As the exercise
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progressed, the Blue and Red force operators became more efficient at using the
simulation hardware as well as more adept at playing the game. The result was the
exclusion of Trial 1 from the original analysis and the loss of the intended “base case.”
In addition to the unintentional “learning” that was observed, exercise participants on
both sides intentionally varied their tactics. Specifically the Blue force was responsible
for positioning their available ISR assets before the start of each trial. The Red force was
also encouraged to vary their tactics to keep the element of surprise (Burke, 2005:66).
Assuming that the distributions of the TTIs for each design case are the same may or may
not be reasonable. However, given the similar process that generated them, we assume
they are close enough for our purposes. The distributions are not normal and the central
limit theorem cannot be used because we lack identical and independent replications for
each design trial (Wackerly, 2002:346-348). The distribution variances cannot be
assumed the same either.
Although many assumptions about the data cannot be made, nonparametric
statistics may still be used to perform statistical analysis (Wackerly, 2002:708-709).
Many nonparametric statistics only require that the data be continuous and random
(Neter, 1988:481). Unfortunately, in order to perform any form of hypothesis testing still
requires independence. A nonparametric confidence interval for the population median
can be determined for a large-sample (n >15) single-population using the following
method; all data in this analysis contained at least 15 data-points. For a desired 1 - α
confidence coefficient for confidence interval Lr ≤ η ≤ Ur such that Lr and Ur are the rth
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smallest and largest samples respectively. The variable r is the largest integer that does
not exceed the value of equation (1) (Neter, 1988:485).
r = 0.5[n + 1 - z(1 - α/2)√n]

(1)

A large majority of the TTI values are zero because many target identifications
are generated by the same sensor that initially detected them. Therefore, it is more
appropriate to use the median TTI rather than the mean TTI. The median is the middle of
a distribution such that half of all values are above and below it. This makes the median
much less susceptible to extreme values than the mean and thus more appropriate for this
study.
Summary
This chapter introduced the general experimental architecture and design of
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I and pointed out the limitations of an experimental design
where more than a single parameter is varied in each trial. Next, it discussed data
collection, data reduction, and the difficulties of working with such a large and expanding
dataset. Next, this chapter discussed the limitations of working with single-replication
datasets that preclude typical parametric statistical methods of analysis. Finally, this
chapter discussed a nonparametric method to generate confidence intervals for the
median value of that data.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter details the data analysis performed on the data from URBAN
RESOLVE Phase I for this research. Where applicable the analysis involves not only the
complete dataset for a given trial, but also decomposition by target-type and the trackoriginating sensor.
Data Analysis
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I consisted of seven different trials of which six
datasets were obtained (Trial 3b was missing). Within each trial folder there was a file
containing the complete list of Red Force tracks generated during a run. Each record
included the platform, sensor, and time for track detection and, when available, track
identification. Track identification data was not available if the track was not identified.
This analysis focuses its efforts only on tracks that were identified. The data was
manipulated using Microsoft Excel to sort the tracks by identifying time and the TTI was
calculated from the difference between the track identifying and originating times. The
tracks were sorted again based on TTI and the process was repeated for the remaining
trial datasets.
Initially we considered the mean TTI for all tracks. However, the data included a
significant number of zero data points which skewed the data (i.e. eighty-nine percent of
all tracks in Trial 4b possessed a TTI of zero). A TTI = 0 meant the track was identified
immediately by the detecting sensor and is termed an “Instant-ID.” In an effort to
minimize the effects of these extreme data points, the median TTI was used. Use of the
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median statistic helps reduce the effect of extreme values. The median is the middle data
point such that there are an equal number of data points above and below the median
value. However, once the zeros were removed the median TTIs all dropped to 0.0
minutes (Table 5).

All Targets

Table 5. All Target Types, All IDs
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Total Detections
28517
13847
7902
8159
13385
11098

Total IDs
10236
3352
3130
3501
3888
4369

Median TTI
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Mean TTI
5.9
5.0
2.2
12.9
2.4
2.1

Max TTI
8398.0
4997.0
4140.0
1425.0
5595.0
5394.0

Instant-ID
54%
63%
66%
56%
84%
89%

As a next step in the analysis, the tracks were broken down by target in the hope
that some information related to the TTI for different targets may be found within and
between the trials. For the purpose of this analysis, and to remain consistent with
previous analysis, target types were grouped into eight target groups as shown in Table 6.
The target groups categorize the targets such that similar or related targets can be viewed
together.
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Table 6. Target Groups
Target Group
Artillery
Air Defense

Mechanized
TEL, WMD, MTT
Leaders
Armed Civilians
Soldiers

Others

Target Types
120mm Mortar
105mm Howitzer
AAA
SA-15
AD Command Vehicle
SA-15 Decoy
Quad SA18
ZU-23
SA-11
Snow Drift Radar
BMP-3
T-90
T-90 Decoy
BTR-80
SS26 TEL
MAZ6430 Truck
SS26 TEL Decoy
SS26 Command Vehicle SS26 TEL Reload Vehicle
Leaders
Armed Civilians
Soldiers
Civilian UNIMOG Truck Small Car
Military UNIMOG Truck Motorcyclist
Large Truck
SUV
Medium Truck
SUV Command Vehicle
URAL Truck
Technical
ZIL-157 Cargo Truck

Now that the data was separated by target group, two target groups did possess
median TTIs greater than zero. These target groups were the Armed Civilians (Table 7)
and Mechanized target groups (Table 8). Within these two target groups only Trials 1,
2b, and Trial 3a, possess non-zero median TTIs. The data for the other target groups may
be found in Appendix B.
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Armed Civilians

Table 7. Armed Civilians, All IDs
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Total Detections
1729
1563
414
3465
4959
3689

Total IDs
197
215
42
702
609
624

Lr
9.0
2.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Median TTI
12.8
3.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
15.7
4.0
2.9
0.2
0.0
0.0

Max TTI
317.5
95.2
157.9
653.8
171.8
259.9

Instant-ID
21%
50%
57%
52%
75%
86%

Mechanized

Table 8. Mechanized Targets, All IDs
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Total Detections
3148
3618
490
279
518
371

Total IDs
1802
462
192
141
256
200

Lr
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.4
0.0
0.0

Median TTI
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.9
0.0
0.0

Ur
0.0
0.0
1.8
7.7
0.0
0.5

Max TTI
333.8
1081.6
149.8
303.9
249.6
303.6

Instant-ID
69%
73%
55%
35%
77%
58%

Although there are three instances, where the median TTI was greater than zero,
no confidence level can be associated with those estimates. Using the single-sample
confidence interval discussed in Chapter 3, 95% confidence intervals for the median TTI
were calculated for the Mechanized and Armed Civilian target groups. The results are
shown in Table 7 and Table 8. The column labeled ‘r” shows the values calculated using
equation (1) while the columns labeled Lr and Ur show the lower and upper bounds of the
median TTI at the 95% confidence level. Here we see that the only trial with a lower
bound not equal to zero is Trial 3a. We can conclude with 95% confidence that the
median TTI for Trial 3a is non-zero. However, a comparison with the other trials is not
truly possible because of the lack of independence. Not surprisingly, Trial 3a possessed
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the fewest identifications with TTI = 0 as evidenced by the 35% Instant-IDs. Trial 3a is
also the trial with the fewest total IDs.
As discussed earlier, the experimental design allowed variation of multiple
parameters between each trial. As such, it is difficult to make any conclusions about the
cause of the non-zero median TTI for Trial 3a relative to the other trials. It is tempting to
look at Trial 3a’s reduced target signature parameter and conclude that was the cause for
the non-zero TTI and even the lower number of Total IDs. However, Trial 4b had both a
reduced signature parameter and a reduced sensor inventory parameter, yet still possessed
a median TTI lower bound of 0.0 minutes. Similarly, comparisons between Trial 3a and
4a are tempting but the absence of Tags makes it difficult, coupled with Trial 4a’s 0.0
minutes median TTI upper bound.
Next, we focused on data points where TTI was greater than zero. These tracks
required an additional sensor detection before the target could be identified with
confidence. The need for this “second-look” was the result of conditions within the
synthetic environment that prevented the sensor from identifying the target with a high
degree of confidence. Another cause for second-look identifications were sensors
specifically indented to cue another sensor without producing a track on the operator’s
Shared Tactical Picture display. Analysis of tracks with TTI > 0 was performed on the
Armed Civilians and Mechanized target groups. The resulting data can be found in Table
9 and Table 10 respectively.
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Armed Civilians

Table 9. Armed Civilians, TTI > 0
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Total IDs
155
107
18
339
150
89

Min TTI
0.1
0.1
2.1
0.1
0.5
0.1

Lr
14.8
2.1
4.0
6.2
3.4
1.7

Median TTI
17.4
2.3
11.7
8.6
3.9
2.6

Ur
22.7
2.9
21.7
13.6
5.1
4.4

Max TTI
317.5
95.2
157.9
653.8
171.8
259.9

Mechanized

Table 10. Mechanized Targets, TTI > 0
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Total IDs
562
124
87
92
62
88

Min TTI
0.1
0.5
0.7
0.1
1.6
0.3

Lr
12.1
8.5
9.2
8.0
17.6
10.8

Median TTI
14.1
16.7
11.7
10.9
24.6
15.4

Ur
15.5
31.0
14.9
15.2
41.2
19.8

Max TTI
333.8
1081.6
149.8
303.9
249.6
303.6

Figure 4 shows the median TTI along with the 95% upper and lower confidence
intervals for the Armed Civilian target group. As Figure 4 shows, the only trial that does
not overlap with the majority of the others is Trial 1. Given what we know about the
learning curve experiences in the exercise this comes as no surprise. Although Trial 2a
overlaps with Trials 2b, 4a, and 4b, it does have the tightest confidence interval. This is
an interesting result as it is also only the second trial that occurred where there may have
still be some learning occurring. Compared with the other trials, 2a is also the only trial
with full inventory and signatures but an inactive force. Recall that the inactive force
parameter means 70% of the enemy targets begin the simulation already within the AOI.
Further analysis would be required to determine any causal effect between enemy forces
that are already inside the AOI vs. ones that could be observed traveling into the AOI.
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Trial 3a can be seen outside the ranges of trials 2a, 4a, and 4b and may be an area for
further study. Trials 4a and 4b do not appear to be significantly different. This result is
curious since when you recall that Trial 4a used the full inventory and full signature
design variables while Trial 4b used the reduced level for both parameters. The
expectation here would be for there to be a noticeable difference in the ability of the Blue
force to find and identify targets. The extremely wide range for Trial 2b may be due to
the very low count (18) compared to the other trials.

Armed Civilians Median TTI
25.0

-Inventory
+Signature
-Activity
+Tags

Median TTI (min)

20.0
+Inventory
-Signature
+Activity
+Tags

15.0
+Inventory
+Signature
+Activity
+Tags

10.0
+Inventory
+Signature
+Activity
-Tags

+Inventory
+Signature
-Activity
+Tags

-Inventory
-Signature
+Activity
-Tags

5.0

ID Count

155

184

18

1

2a

2b

339

150

89

3a

4a

4b

0.0
Trial

Figure 4. Median TTI and 95% Confidence Interval for Armed Civilian Targets

Figure 5 shows the median TTI along with the 95% upper and lower confidence
intervals for the Mechanized target group. The lower bound for Trial 4a is higher than
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the upper bounds of Trials 1, 2b, and 3a, but not Trials 2a and 4b. Unlike with the Armed
Civilians, the confidence intervals for Trials 4a and 4b are close to not overlapping. As
mentioned earlier, differences between these two trials are expected. However, the result
is even more curious than before because the median TTI for Trial 4a is actually longer
than for Trial 4b. The normal expectation would be for this trend to be reversed. Finally
comparing the Armed Civilians and the Mechanized targets, we see that the relative size
of the confidence intervals is inverted such that trials with the larger intervals in Table 9
possess the relatively smaller intervals in Table 10 and visa versa. Although there is no
apparent explanation for the result, it begs the question why.

Mechanized Median TTI
45.0

40.0
+Inventory
+Signature
-Activity
+Tags

35.0

Median TTI (min)

30.0

-Inventory
-Signature
+Activity
-Tags

25.0
-Inventory
+Signature
-Activity
+Tags

+Inventory
+Signature
+Activity
+Tags

20.0

+Inventory
-Signature
+Activity
+Tags
+Inventory
+Signature
+Activity
-Tags

15.0

10.0

5.0
ID Count

562

124

87

1

2a

2b

92

62

88

3a

4a

4b

0.0
Trial

Figure 5. Median TTI and 95% Confidence Interval for Mechanized Targets
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Next, we looked at the tracks based on the initial detecting platform (UAV and
OAV) and the corresponding TTI. The UGSs were not included because they
represented a very small proportion of the total track detections (~2%). Table 11 shows
the total number of IDs produced by both platforms, the total number of IDs with TTI >
0, the median TTI for all non-zero TTIs and their 95% confidence intervals. The first
item of interest is the All IDs count. The OAVs produced significantly more IDs than the
UAVs. This is not a surprising result considering there were approximately five times as
many OAVs in each trial as there were UAVs, however the OAV’s All IDs counts are not
consistently five time larger than the UAVs. When looking only at the IDs where TTI is
greater than zero, the OAVs in Trial 1 are the only significant outliers from the rest of the
OAV. The fact that Trial 1 has such a tight confidence interval and lower median TTI is
notable given the learning that is supposed to have occurred during Trial 1 as well as the
large track count which would normally result in a wider spread of values. Further
analysis may explain why detections generated by the OAVs in Trial 1 required so little
time to identify in comparison to the other trial. Unfortunately, not much else can be said
about the data. The UAV TTI confidence intervals all overlap with both each other and
their corresponding OAV values.
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Table 11. TTI Data for UAVs and OAVs
UAV
Tracks with TTI > 0

All IDs
Trial
1
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Count
2715
761
39
555
838
897

Count
1002
76
16
24
14
50

r
470
29
4
7
3
18

Lr
4.4
1.4
1.3
2.3
0.5
2.3

Median
TTI
5.1
1.7
2.2
4.5
3.2
11.3

OAV
Tracks with TTI > 0

All IDs
Ur
5.7
2.1
15.5
16.6
23.6
16.0

Count
6243
2410
2563
2480
2814
3108

Count
3040
1044
651
1155
520
343

r
1466
490
300
544
238
153

Lr
3.5
7.8
6.0
4.8
6.6
8.0

Median
TTI
3.9
8.0
6.6
5.7
8.1
9.6

Ur
4.3
8.2
7.9
6.2
9.7
11.2

A final attempt to extract useful information from the data focused on the how
fast IDs were generated in each trial for the Armed Civilians and Mechanized Targets; all
ISR platforms were included. Two charts were generated for each target group, an
accumulated ID count, and a proportion of the total ID count. Figure 6 and Figure 7
show the data for the Armed Civilians and Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the data for the
Mechanized targets. Note that in Figure 8 the chart stops at 24 hours in order to better
illustrate the differences between the trials. Figure 6 shows a few interesting features.
Trial 3a accumulated identified targets significantly faster than all other trials. Again,
because of the experimental design it is difficult to determine an exact cause with another
trial to compare to with only single parameters being changed. However, it is interesting
to note that Trial 3a does have the reduced signature parameter yet still generated more
targets, faster than all other trials. Similarly, Trials 1 and 2b showed that significantly
fewer tracks were accumulated at a slower rate. Although difficult to pinpoint the cause,
Trial 1 makes sense due to learning, and Trial 2b because of the reduced sensor
inventory, inactive force, and only 18 hours worth of data. Even if Trial 2b had

40

continued for another 6 hours, the slope of the curve indicates it is unlikely to have
caught up to 3a, 4a, or 4b. A very interesting result is the apparent similarity between
Trials 4a and 4b. The two parameters that are varied between these trials (inventory and
signature) lead to the natural assumption that Trial 4b should accumulate fewer tracks at a
slower rate. Further analysis may be warranted to determine why this is occurring.

Accumulate IDs vs Time
Armed Civilians - 48 Hours
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Figure 6. Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Armed Civilians

The proportional accumulation of Armed Civilians shown in Figure 7 shows an
interesting trend for Trial 1 where it appears that the IDs accumulate very slowly at first
then accelerates at an increasing rate after the first 24-hours. Note that because of the 48hour run time of Trial 1 it has been displayed in two 24-hour segments. The first segment
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clearly shows a slower accumulation of identifications with a sudden increase in the 23rd
hour. The second segment of Trial 1 is on par with the other trials. This behavior is
likely indicative of the learning discussed in the original URBAN RESOLVE analysis.
All of the other trials appear to accumulate their IDs at a similar and linear rate.
Additional replications would be required before additional insight could be gained
concerning the shape of the curves. Trial 2b was removed because of its 18-hour
timeframe.
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Figure 7. Proportion of Total Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Armed Civilians

Figure 8 shows a rather different story from Figure 6. Here Trial 1 accumulates
many more Mechanized target IDs at a much faster rate and Trial 3a accumulates the
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fewest IDs at the slowest rate. Trials 4a and 4b now show a slight difference in both
accumulation total and rate; however, it is only a slight difference especially considering
the inventory and signature difference between them and compared to Trials 1 and 2a.
Trial 2b managed to accumulate IDs at a comparable rate to Trials 4a and 4b, and the data
at least suggests that it would have accumulated a similar number of IDs had it continued
for the full 24 hours. Finally, Trial 2b compares more similarly with the other trials and
shows a marked difference compared to the Armed Civilians where it accumulated
identifications on par with Trial 1 and much slower than the other trials.
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Figure 8. Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Mechanized Targets
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Trial 4b

Finally, Figure 9 shows the proportional accumulation of Mechanized IDs.
Again, the curve for Trial 2b has been removed because of its 18-hour timeframe. As
before, Trial 1 has been split into two 24-hour sections. The fist 24 hours shows a
slightly slower accumulation compared to the other trials but not nearly to the extent as
with the Armed Civilians. The second segment of Trial 1 shows an accumulation that is
significantly steeper than the other trials especially compared to the second segment of
Trial 1 for the Armed Civilians. Although there is not a significant difference between
the trials of the Mechanized IDs, the difference between the two target groups is
interesting.
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Figure 9. Proportion of Total Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Mechanized Targets
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Summary
This chapter detailed various attempts to distill useful information from the vast
data set created in the URBAN RESOLVE exercise despite significant limitations due to
the experimental design and lack of replications. Non-parametric statistical techniques
were used to calculate 95% confidence intervals for the median TTI for all target types
and for each target group. Analysis of all Armed Civilian and Mechanized target group
IDs showed that Trials 2a and 3a had non-zero TTIs with 95% confidence. Analysis of
only the identifications requiring a second-look (TTI > 0) showed some interesting,
though inconclusive, trends that run counter to what would be anticipated. This chapter
also discussed the analysis of TTI data relative to the initial detecting platform (UAV vs.
OAV). Finally, this chapter discussed the analysis of the accumulation rate of
identification versus time for the Armed Civilian and Mechanized target groups. Some
interesting trends were noted which may indicate possible areas for deeper analysis.

45

V. Conclusions
Chapter Overview
This chapter will provide a summary discussion of this research effort. First, it
will discuss the results of the analysis performed during this research effort. Next will be
a brief discussion of the obstacles encountered during the course of this research. Finally,
it will suggest areas for further research in this topic area.
Analysis Results
This research identified two notable trends in the URBAN RESOLVE data. First,
despite the “learning” that took place during Trial 1, the TTI for all target types was zero
minutes for all of the trials. When looking at individual target groups, the Armed
Civilians were the only target group with a Trial 1 TTI that stood out as different from
the other target groups. When examining only the IDs with TTI > 0, the Armed Civilians
in Trial 1 seemed to possess a noticeably longer TTI. This result is to be expected given
the “learning” that was supposed to have taken place. However, when examining the
TTIs for the Mechanized target group, Trial 1 was reasonably similar compared to the
other trials. Finally, analysis of the accumulated IDs versus time showed a similar result
where fewer Armed Civilians were identified at a slower pace in Trial 1 compared to the
other trials. On the other hand, the exact opposite was true for the Mechanized target
group where many more targets were identified at a much faster rate than the other trials.
Second, although it is difficult to make causal comparisons relative to the design
parameters and results, Trials 4a and 4b provide the best chance to observe the difference
between what can be considered the best case scenario (full inventory / full signature) and
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worst case scenario (reduced inventory / reduced signature) with no other differences in
design. However, what was observed most often was at best a complete lack of
differentiation between the two trials, and at worst, results that appeared completely
counter intuitive to the expected results. The initial URBAN RESOLVE report noted that
Trials 4a and 4b helped demonstrate the importance of Tags when compared to the other
trials.
The two trends mentioned above raise questions that bare further study:
•

Why are the Armed Civilians noticeably different from the other target
groups?

•

Why does the Mechanized target group exhibit different behavior from the
Armed Civilians?

•

Why are the results from Trials 4a and 4b so similar in some cases and
counter-intuitive in others?

Obstacles
During the initial phases of this research, the intent was to investigate possible
applications of JSAF in simulating the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) and
possible applications related to modeling of the time sensitive targeting (TST) kill-chain.
The goal was to generate an appropriate environment and scenario in JSAF and to use
that environment to investigate the ability to simulate the Combat Operations TCT cell of
an AOC. However, it became apparent that such an effort was too large an undertaking
for the time and resources available.
As research progressed, and the existence of JSAF’s use by other agencies
became known, the hope was to build on their research and possibly modify their
scenarios. Attempts were made to acquire some portion of the URBAN RESOLVE
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scenario in the hope that it could be used to perform simulations locally. However, even
that proved impossible. A JSAF scenario cannot be easily broken down into pieces for
independent use. The very strengths of JSAF that make it such a powerful tool, its ability
to operate in real-time with HITL participants and a large numbers of autonomous
entities generated through multiple distributed computing clusters, makes its utility trivial
when operated on a single workstation. A project that seemed ambitious at first quickly
became impossible as time marched on.
Ultimately, the scope and scale of the URBAN RESOLVE exercise presented a
possible foothold for research. The sheer size of the dataset promised to be a treasure
trove for analysis, however very size of the dataset made it difficult to obtain. After
nearly five weeks of unsuccessful attempts to acquire and convert a four-hour portion of
data (8GB), we were finally able to access the entire dataset housed on the J9 servers via
the DREN.
Recommendations for Future Research
Several avenues for further research readily present themselves in relation to past
and future incarnations of URBAN RESOLVE. Analysis to answer the questions raised
in this research may help improve the design of future URBAN RESOLVE events.
Additional research using more sophisticated data mining techniques may illuminate
additional trends in the data that have not yet been discovered. Another area for future
research is the development of pattern recognition tools to cue operators towards possible
activity of interest based on track identity, behavior, and proximity to other tracks.
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Finally, multiple replications of the trials, using different groups of operators, may
provide a deeper analysis and expose unseen trends.
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Appendix A. Analysis Questions and Measures of Performance
Q1. To what extent can SA/SU be developed in JUO
M1.1 Number of Critical Command Nodes Identified
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths
b Terminal points of Red DI paths
c Red Vehicle congregation points
d Red DI congregation points
e Buildings housing several (> n) Red vehicles
f Buildings housing many (> n) Red DI
g Number of RF transmissions from individual bldgs
h Number of RF transmissions from specific locations
M1.2 Number of Critical Weapon Nodes Identified
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths (see M1.1)
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (see M1.1)
c Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (characteristics)
d Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (location)
e Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (characteristics)
f Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (location)
M1.3 Number of Other Critical Nodes (or patterns) Identified
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths (M1.1)
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (M1.1)
c Red Vehicle congregation points (M1.1)
d Red DI congregation points (M1.1)
e Vehicle relative positions while in transit (signature formations)
f DI relative positions while in transit (signature formations)
g Number of features detected
h Number of features recognized
I Number of features identified
j Locations of detected features
k Locations of recognized features (by category)
l Locations of identified features (by category)
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M1.4 Anticipated Red Activities
a Number of tracks of duration > n minutes [n = 5, 10, 15, …]
b Number of tracks in which targets are correctly identified for > n minutes
c Number of tracks in which targets are correctly recognized for > n minutes
d Number of tracks in which targets are correctly classified for > n minutes
e Number of false targets tracked for > n minutes
f Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly classified for > n minutes
g Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly recognized for > n minutes
h Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly identified for > n minutes
i Duration of tracks for all categories above
j Number of features detected through "Change Detection"
k Number of features recognized through "Change Detection"
l Number of features identified through "Change Detection"
m Locations of features detected through "Change Detection"
n Locations of features recognized through "Change Detection"
o Locations of features identified through "Change Detection"

Q2. How effectively are sensor data used to detect and correlate targets?
M2.1. Track Profile and Utility
a Number of tracks of duration > n minutes; n = 5, 10, …
b Track identifiers (trks > n min)
c Target ids (trks > n min)
d Major and minor axes of position estimates (trks > n min)
e True target type (trks > n min)
f Perceived target type (trks > n min)
g Sensors contributing to establishing/maintaining the track
h Platforms contributing to establishing/maintaining the track
Sensor-Platform combinations (e.g., MWIR/ NFOV - UAV 3) contributing to establishing/
I maintaining the track
M2.2. Time to correlate target acquisitions
a Number requiring > n minutes from detection to establishing track; n = 5, 10, …
b Number requiring > n minutes from detection to classification; n = 5, 10, …
c Number requiring > n minutes from initial acquisition to recognition; n = 5, 10, …
d Number requiring > n minutes from initial acquisition to identification; n = 5, 10, …
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M2.3 Effectiveness of Each Sensor System (e.g., MWIR/ WFOV )
a Population of targets of each type (function of time)
b Bubble charts of sensor target interactions (number of interactions)
c Number of each type target detected by each sensor class (unique entities detected)
d Number of each type target correctly recognized by each sensor class
e Number of each type target correctly identified by each sensor class
f Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each sensor class
g Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each sensor class
h "Failed Detections" by Sensor class due to MDV
I "Failed Detections" by Sensor class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration
j "Failed Detections" per Sensor by class due to MDV
k "Failed Detections" per Sensor by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration
l Sensor class providing initial acquisition of each target (may be emission)
m Sensor class providing initial correct recognition (possibly none)
n Sensor class providing initial correct identification (possibly none)
o Sensor classes (PLURAL) responsible for establishing track
M2.4 Effectiveness of Each Sensor-Platform Class (e.g., MWIR/WFOV - UAV3)
a Population of targets of each type (function of time) [see M.2.3]
b Number of each type target detected by each sensor-platform class
c Number of each type target correctly recognized by each sensor-platform class
d Number of each type target correctly identified by each sensor-platform class
e Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each sensor-platform class
f Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each sensor-platform class
g "Failed Detections" by Sensor-Platform class due to MDV
h "Failed Detections" by Sensor-Platform class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration
i "Failed Detections" per Sensor-Platform by class due to MDV
j "Failed Detections" per Sensor-Platform by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage obscuration
k Sensor-Platform class providing initial acquisition of each target
l Sensor-Platform class providing initial recognition
m Sensor-Platform class providing initial identification
n Sensor-Platform classes responsible for establishing track
o Sensor-Platform classes responsible for update that "correctly identifies" track
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M2.5 Effectiveness of Each Platform Class (e.g., UAV3)
a Population of targets of each type (function of time) [see M.2.3]
b Number of each type target detected by each platform class (unique entities)
c Number of each type target correctly recognized by each platform class
d Number of each type target correctly identified by each platform class
e Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each platform class
f Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each platform class
g "Failed Detections" by Platform class due to MDV
h "Failed Detections" by Platform class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration
i "Failed Detections" per Platform by class due to MDV
j "Failed Detections" per Platform by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration
k Platform class providing initial acquisition of each target
l Platform class providing initial recognition
m Platform class providing initial identification
n Platform classes responsible for establishing track
M2.6 Sensor platform tasking and retasking responsiveness
a

Time of each sensor request, by type of sensor and platform

b Type of request (automated retasking, operator decisions, etc.)
c Time request is received by controlling agent (sensor type and platform)
d Time task or retask begins (sensor type and platform)
e Time of arrival of retasked platform in target area
f Length of retasking chain [how many platforms are retasked serially, parallel?]
g Outcome [failed to find target][found intended target][found something]
h Time [if successful] sensor acquires intended target (sensor type and platform)
M2.7 Timing and events in target prosecution chain
a Time of initial detection
b Type of sensor performing initial detection (see M2.3)
c Type of platform performing initial detection (see M2.3)
d Time higher level sensor is tasked to query detected target
e Type of sensor tasked for higher level acquisition (See M2.3)
f Type of platform tasked for higher level acquisition (see M2.3)
g Time of higher level acquisition(s)
h Type of sensor performing higher level acquisition (see M2.3)
i Type of platform performing higher level acquisition (see M2.3)
j Time of declaration "target of interest"
k Time of declaration "target is recommended"
l Operator override of sensor-provided track identity (time and imposed type)
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Q 3. What conditions affect Blue capabilities?
M3.1 Impact of Terrain and Buildings on sensor operations
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections)
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window
c Number of false alarms and mis-acquisitions in "n" minute windows
d Targets never detected [type, number, location]
e Locations of detected targets [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc]
f Location where tracks are established [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc]
g Location where tracks are lost [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc]
h Time-position history of gaps in tracks
M3.2 Temporal effects on sensor operations
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections) by time
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window by time (same as above?)
c Number of false alarms and mis-acquisitions in "n-minute" windows
d Time tracks are established [morning rush hour, midday, evening rush, nighttime, etc]
e Time tracks are lost [morning rush hour, midday, evening rush, nighttime, etc]
f Time history of gaps in tracks
M3.3 Impact of Red Counter Measures on sensor operations
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections)
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window
c Sensors neutralized/compromised by deliberate Red action
d Platforms destroyed by Red munitions
M3.4 Actions most favorable to Red
a Red formations when acquired [small group, large group, individual vehicle/DI]
b Red formations when not acquired [small group, large group, individual vehicle/DI]
c Red Activity when acquired [on road movement, WMD set up, static, etc]
d Red Activity when not acquired [on road movement, WMD set up, static, etc]
e Location where acquired [M3.1]
f Location where not acquired [M3.1]{where Red is unlikely to be detected}
g Time when acquired [M3.2]
h Time when not acquired [M3.2]{when Red is unlikely to be detected}
M3.5 Communications
a Histogram of lengths of messages sent (bytes), aggregated and by transmitter type
b Histogram of lengths of messages received (bytes)
c Number of messages sent as a function of time, aggregated and by transmitter type
d Number of messages received as a function of time
e Number of messages transmitted but not received due to no LOS
f Number of messages transmitted but not received due to low power (SLMM)
g Number of messages transmitted but not received due to reasons other than LOS or PWR
h Histogram of number of lost messages by reason for loss.
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Appendix B. Additional Analysis Results

Soldiers

Soldiers, All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
13309
2442
2460
2722
1773
1407

Total
IDs
5082
1577
1933
1905
1270
1181

Max
ID
Time
227.0
34.1
71.6
575.0
77.9
95.2

Mean
6.3
3.9
2.2
5.3
2.9
2.0

STD
14.9
5.2
4.9
20.1
7.3
7.2

Median
0.9
0.7
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.0

r
2471
749
923
910
600
557

Lr
0.8
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
1.1
0.9
0.2
0.9
0.0
0.0

InstantID
30%
44%
51%
48%
75%
82%

r
901
391
377
270
747
1051

Lr
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

InstantID
91%
98%
98%
88%
95%
96%

r
141
18
23
19
34
31

Lr
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

InstantID
93%
100%
100%
69%
100%
91%

Others

Other Target Types All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
8398
4997
4140
1425
5595
5394

Total
IDs
1888
839
811
587
1572
2195

Max
ID
Time
265.5
84.7
2.5
451.9
27.7
323.4

Mean
1.3
0.2
0.0
1.7
0.2
0.4

STD
9.3
3.2
0.2
20.9
1.1
7.3

Median
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Artillery

Artillery Target Types, All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
367
132
62
66
111
83

Total
IDs
318
49
62
52
87
80

Max
ID
Time
25.1
0.0
0.0
75.6
0.0
28.4

Mean
0.4
0.0
0.0
4.4
0.6
0.6
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STD
2.3
0.0
0.0
14.2
0.0
3.4

Median
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6

Air Defense

Air Defense Target types, All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
845
206
244
161
370
112

Total
IDs
453
67
48
91
52
65

Max
ID
Time
240.5
690.9
59.5
484.1
44.7
71.7

Mean
10.2
19.0
4.3
21.1
6.1
7.4

STD
25.7
86.6
12.6
70.8
11.6
12.3

r
206
25
17
36
19
25

Lr
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.9

InstantID
66%
81%
83%
67%
71%
55%

Median
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

r
226
60
15
7
11
8

Lr
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Ur
0.0
0.0
0.0
28.6
0.0
0.0

InstantID
88%
96%
88%
63%
94%
88%

Median
0.0
0.0
----0.0
---

r

Lr
--------0.0
---

Ur
--------0.6
---

Median
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

TEL, WMD, MTT

TEL, WMD, MTT, All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
637
864
86
31
41
35

Total
IDs
495
143
43
24
34
25

Max
ID
Time
86.0
2.6
54.0
626.8
25.2
10.5

Mean
2.1
2.9
3.0
80.5
0.9
0.7

STD
8.4
12.9
9.8
176.1
4.4
2.2

Leaders

Leaders, All IDs

Trial
01
02a
02b
03a
04a
04b

Total
Detections
84
25
6
10
18
7

Total
IDs
2
1
0
0
9
0

Max
ID
Time
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.0

Mean
0.0
0.0
----0.2
---
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STD
0.0
0.0
----0.3
---

0
0
0
0
2
0

InstantID
100%
100%

56%
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force retreated into the city while a Blue force attempted to determine the enemy’s Order of Battle. The exercise
generated over 3.7 terabytes of data in seven distinct trials. This research evaluated the time required to identify
targets after detection and the accumulation of identifications over time, and searched for trends between the seven
design trials and between target groups. Two trends emerged from this research. First, there was a notable
difference in the time required to identify a target once it has been detected based on its target group. Second, two
design trials that are expected to demonstrate show counter-intuitive results.
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